Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations

The question addressed in this analysis is whether endowing agents with various forms of asymmetric power makes cooperation more likely across a variety of structural settings of conflict and cooperation present in international relations. To address this question, an agent-based model incorporating asymmetric power among agents in a set of (2 Â 2) games that represent different forms of conflict and cooperation prevalent in international relations (Chicken, Stag, Assurance, Deadlock, and Prisoner's Dilemma) is developed and analyzed via simulation. Simulation results indicate that the introduction of asymmetric power substantially increases the chances that both cooperative agents survive and cooperative worlds evolve. This is particularly the case when agents are endowed with the ability to selectively interact with other agents. Also, anticipated variations in outcomes across the game structures regarding the likelihood of cooperation are supported. Whether and how cooperation evolves in social settings characterized by the presence of selfish agents engaged in repeated relations without central authority has been of considerable importance to scholars of international politics and of interest to scholars across all the social sciences as well as philosophy, biology, and computer science. 1 International relations scholars have been particularly interested in various features of nation-states, the relations among nation-states, and the structural environment in which nation-states are embedded that make cooperation either possible or more likely. Studying the evolution of cooperation in the context of the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) has proven to be quite fruitful for international relations scholars. Yet, the RPD framework is also restrictive in a variety of ways. 3 For instance, while the RPD captures one important type of relationship among nation-states in the international system, there are a number of other structural settings that (1984), the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) has become the central metaphor for the evolution of cooperation in populations of selfish agents without central authority

No control, no drive: How noise may undermine conservation behavior in a commons dilemma

Sometimes people may no longer engage in conservational behavior (e.g., to reduce emissions) because their attempts to do so have been thwarted by "negative noise ", or external forces that may cause otherwise cooperative intentions to translate into non-cooperative action (e.g., strikes prevented to commute by public transport rather than by car). The purpose of the present research is to examine whether experiences with negative noise in a commons dilemma may undermine conservational motivation and behavior, even in a subsequent commons dilemma that is free of noise. Participants first interacted in a commons dilemma task-with noise versus without noise-in which the common pool was sustained versus deteriorating. Afterwards, participants were involved in an identical second task in the same pool size condition but noise-free for everybody. Consistent with hypotheses, participants who faced noise and a deteriorating resource in the first task exhibited lower levels of conservation in the second task than did participants who were always acting free of noise. This pattern was mediated by a reduced motivation to preserve the common pool, suggesting that the experience of noise in combination with a decline in collective resources may especially undermine cooperative motivation and behavior. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Coercive and legitimate authority impact tax honesty:Evidence from behavioral and ERP experiments

Cooperation in social systems such as tax honesty is of central importance in our modern societies. However, we know little about cognitive and neural processes driving decisions to evade or pay taxes. This study focuses on the impact of perceived tax authority and examines the mental chronometry mirrored in ERP data allowing a deeper understanding about why humans cooperate in tax systems. We experimentally manipulated coercive and legitimate authority and studied its impact on cooperation and underlying cognitive (experiment 1, 2) and neuronal (experiment 2) processes. Experiment 1 showed that in a condition of coercive authority, tax payments are lower, decisions are faster and participants report more rational reasoning and enforced compliance, however, less voluntary cooperation than in a condition of legitimate authority. Experiment 2 confirmed most results, but did not find a difference in payments or self-reported rational reasoning. Moreover, legitimate authority led to heightened cognitive control (expressed by increased MFN amplitudes) and disrupted attention processing (expressed by decreased P300 amplitudes) compared to coercive authority. To conclude, the neuronal data surprisingly revealed that legitimate authority may led to higher decision conflict and thus to higher cognitive demands in tax decisions than coercive authority.Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [24863-G1]; Austrian Economic Chamber (WKO)SCI(E)SSCIARTICLE71108-11171

Acute increase of alpha-synuclein inhibits synaptic vesicle recycling evoked during intense stimulation

This work was supported by grants from the NIH/National Institute of Neurological Disorder and Stroke RO1 NS078165 (to J.R.M.), the Morton Cure Paralysis Fund (to J.R.M.), and the Branfman Family Foundation (to J.M.G.) and by a Dorothea Bennett graduate fellowship (to D.J.B.)

Axelrod’s metanorm games on networks

Metanorms is a mechanism proposed to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation. We generalize Axelrod’s analysis of metanorms dynamics to interactions unfolding on networks through simulation and mathematical modeling. Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation. In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperationSpanish MICINN projects CSD2010-00034 (CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and DPI2010-16920, and by the Junta de Castilla y Leo´ n, references BU034A08 and GREX251-2009

Federalism as a Public Good

This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/44798/1/10602_2005_Article_2235.pd

Political Cycles: Issue Ownership and the Opposition Advantage

In modern democracies, common wisdom suggests that political parties alternate in power due to voters' disappointment. The aim of this paper is to show that parties' turnover may be due to voters' "satisfaction." Our model is built on two main assumptions: Parties "own" different issues, and investments in the provision of public goods create a linkage between successive elections. We show that no party can maintain itself in power forever when the median voter is moderate enough. This result holds when the parties' main objective is to win the election and is compatible with a large range of candidates subobjectives that may change from one election to the next. We also provide some novel welfare implications. Whereas rent-seeker candidates always dominate reelection-concerned candidates in one public good models, rent-seeker candidates may be welfare improving compared with reelection-concerned candidates. Copyright � 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..